Seton Hall University

eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship

Seton Hall Law

5-1-2013

Rethinking Non-Failure-to-Warn Claims Against
Generic Drug Manufacturers: An Argument for the
Supreme Court to Reverse Bartlett v. Mutual
Pharmaceutical
Jonathan A. Keller

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Keller, Jonathan A., "Rethinking Non-Failure-to-Warn Claims Against Generic Drug Manufacturers: An Argument for the Supreme
Court to Reverse Bartlett v. Mutual Pharmaceutical" (2013). Law School Student Scholarship. 254.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/254

Rethinking Non-Failure-to-Warn Claims Against Generic Drug Manufacturers: An Argument for
the Supreme Court to Reverse Bartlett v. Mutual Pharmaceutical
Jonathan A. Keller
I.

Introduction

The United States Constitution instituted the concept of federalism, a system of dual
sovereignty between the federal and state governments.1 Such a system sometimes positions
state power against federal power, but other times allows for concurrent authority.2

The

Supremacy Clause of the Constitution resolves conflicts between federal and state law by
providing that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”3 In any preemption case, the
critical question is always whether the relevant state and federal laws, either explicitly or
implicitly, conflict―oftentimes a complex and difficult question to answer.4 In the last few
years, the Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of preemption regarding the laws regulating
prescription pharmaceuticals,5 catapulting product liability actions against drug manufacturers to
the forefront of the debate over the role of federal regulation of prescription drugs.6
In 2009, the Supreme Court first addressed the preemption issue as it applied to the laws
regulating brand-name drug manufacturers. In Wyeth v. Levine,7 the Court held that state law
failure-to-warn claims were neither explicitly nor impliedly preempted by the federal laws
governing prescription drug labeling.8 The Court conducted a detailed analysis of the Food,
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Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), a federal law, and concluded that it afforded brand-name
manufacturers a way to comply with both their state law duty to strengthen the drug’s labeling
and with federal regulations.9
Then, only two years later in 2011, the Supreme Court came to a seemingly opposite
result in its application of preemption to the laws regulating generic drug manufactures. In
PLIVA v. Mensing,10 the Court ruled that state law failure-to-warn clams against generic
manufacturers were implicitly preempted by federal law based on a close reading of the FDCA.11
In reaching its decision, the Court recognized that generic manufacturers are prohibited by
statute from unilaterally changing their product labeling without prior Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approval.12 Unlike brand-name manufacturers, generic manufacturers do
not have the same regulatory mechanisms13 to account for new safety information and would
violate federal law if they unilaterally change their warning labels.14
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Wyeth and Mensing have provided critical guidance
illustrating how the preemption analysis should be applied to the laws regulating brand-name and
generic drug manufacturers in the context of failure-to-warn claims. But, these two cases left
unanswered the preemption question with respect to non-failure-to-warn claims against generic
manufacturers.15

The federal district courts have struggled with this issue, but with near

9

Id. at 556–73.
131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
11
Id. at 2571.
12
Id. at 2574–75 (“The FDA, however, tells us that it interprets its regulations to require that the warning labels of a
brand-name drug and its generic copy must always be the same—thus, generic drug manufacturers have an ongoing
federal duty of ‘sameness.’”); see also 57 Fed. Reg. 17961 (1992) (“[T]he [generic drug’s] labeling must be the
same as the listed drug product’s labeling because the listed drug product is the basis for [generic drug] approval.”).
13
See also 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.70(c)(3)–(6) (The FDA’s changes-being-effected process allows brand-name
manufacturers to add or strengthen warnings and label instructions to increase the safe use of the drug. Brand-name
manufacturers do not need to wait for FDA preapproval when making labeling changes through the CBE process;
rather, they only need to file a supplemental application with the FDA. But, that process allows generic
manufacturers to change its labels only when the brand label is concurrently changed).
14
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2578–79 (2011).
15
See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009); Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567.
10
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unanimity they have adopted a broad reading of Mensing based on its holding and reasoning. 16
Specifically, the district courts have concluded that the rationales enunciated in Mensing, which
preempted state failure-to-warn claims, apply with equal force to, and thus also preempt, state
design defect claims against generic manufacturers.17
In May 2012, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit broke
ranks with every federal district court by upholding a district court’s decision to allow a design

16

See In re Pamidronate Products Liab. Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d 479 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (State law claims challenging
the adequacy of generic drug labeling are preempted. Design defect claims are preempted because the “sameness”
requirement in the labeling context applies equally to generic manufacturers with regards to the design of the drug.
Negligent testing and breach of express warranty claims are warning claims in disguise and are preempted. Implied
warranty claims are design defect claims in disguise and are preempted); In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium)
Products Liab. Litig. (No. II), No. 08–008 (GEB–LHG), 2011 WL 5903623 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2011) (The design of a
generic drug, like its warnings, must be the same as the brand-name reference drug; therefore, design defect claims
and negligent design claims are preempted. Negligence claims relating to generic drug warnings are preempted.
Express warranty, fraud, misrepresentation, and consumer protection claims all attack a drug’s labeling and are thus
preempted); Gross v. Pfizer, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 2d 654 (D. Md. 2011) (Negligence claims alleging that generic
manufacturers had a duty to cease selling their product at all are preempted. Such a claim would directly conflict
with FDA authority to determine what drugs can be sold in interstate commerce. Claims for concealing information
from FDA are warning claims, and are preempted. Claims alleging failure to update do not exist at state law, and in
any event are preempted); Cooper v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-929-JJB, 2012 WL 733846 (M.D. La. Mar. 6, 2012)
(Claims of inadequate post-marketing surveillance of drug’s adverse effects are preempted. Claims that generic
manufacturers had a duty to withdrawal its product from the market are preempted. The fact that defendant’s
generic product has been designated a reference listed drug does not establish that it may unilaterally change its
warnings. Express warranty claims based on labeling are preempted. Design defect claims are not seen as really
challenging the design of the drug, but rather only the warnings, and thus are preempted); Johnson v. Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., No. 2:10 CV 404, 2012 WL 1866839 (W.D. La. May 21, 2012) (All warning claims
preempted. Claims of failure to use additional forms of communication to provide warnings are
preempted. Express warranty and design defect claim asserting an alternative package design are really warning
claims in disguise and are preempted. Design defect claims challenging the composition of the drug itself are
preempted because prior FDA approval is required to change it. A claim that the drug should have been removed
from the market is preempted); In re Darvocet, Darvon & Propoxyphene Products Liab. Litig., No. 2:11–MD–2226–
DCR, 2012 WL 718618 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 5, 2012) (Marketing claims that generic manufacturers had a state duty to
withdrawal its product from the market are preempted. Both design and warning claims are preempted since the
“sameness” obligation applies to the design as well as to the warning requirement for generic drugs. Consumer
fraud and express warranty claims all seek to change the label, and are preempted. Claims based on alleged
violations of the FDCA are preempted as improper private rights of action); Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., No.
5:09CV1767, 2012 WL 1110009 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2012) (State law claims challenging the adequacy of generic
drug labeling are preempted. All non-failure-to-warn claims were inadequately pleaded, but even if they were,
design defect claims would be preempted under the statute’s “sameness” requirement. Claims for breach of express
and implied warranties, misrepresentation, breach of undertaking, fraud, constructive fraud, fraudulent concealment,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress all assert warning claims and are preempted. A claim that the drug
should have been removed from the market is preempted).
17
See In re Pamidronate, 842 F. Supp. 2d 479; In re Fosamax, 2011 WL 5903623; In re Darvocet, 2012 WL
718618.
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defect claim against a generic manufacturer.18 In Bartlett v. Mutual Pharmaceutical, the First
Circuit rejected the generic manufacturer’s argument that, just as in the labeling context in
Mensing, design defect claims against generic manufacturers are preempted since a generic
manufacturer cannot unilaterally alter the composition of is drugs.19 Rather, the First Circuit
found that there was no conflict between the federal and state law, and thus the design defect
claim was not preempted.20
The First Circuit erred in Bartlett because it openly departed from the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Mensing, which explained that because of a generic manufacturers’ “ongoing
federal duty of sameness,” they are prevented from deviating in any material respect from their
brand-name equivalents.21 Had the First Circuit faithfully applied the holding and reasoning in
Mensing, it would have concluded that because the “impossibility” of changing a generic drug’s
labeling under federal law led to the preemption of failure-to-warn claims, then the
“impossibility” of changing a drug’s chemical composition under federal law would have also
led to the preemption of design defect claims.22 Recognizing this tension between Bartlett and
the Court’s prior decision in Mensing, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review Bartlett
and definitively answer whether non-failure-to-warn claims against generic manufacturers are
preempted.23
This Comment will focus on the viability of state law design defect claims against
generic drug manufacturers, arguing that federal law preempts such claims. Part II of this
Comment will begin by detailing the regulatory scheme under the FDCA, placing the preemption
18

Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc., 678 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2012).
Id. at 37–38.
20
Id. at 37 (Court explained that because there was no federal law requiring Mutual to sell its generic drug, then a
state law requiring Mutual to withdrawal the drug from the market would not conflict with federal requirements.
Thus, the court concluded it was not impossible for Mutual to comply with both federal and state law).
21
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574–75.
22
See infra Part V.
23
Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
19
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issue in context.24 In doing so, the FDCA and FDA regulations concerning drug manufacturers’
ability to change their product labeling and composition post market will be examined and
contrasted to the corresponding state law. Part III will discuss three product liability actions that
an individual may bring against a drug manufacturer.25

This part will specifically address the

issues that arise when design defect claims are brought against drug manufacturers. Part IV will
begin by setting forth the different types of preemption. 26 Then, it will examine Wyeth v. Levine
and PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, the two high-profile Supreme Court cases that have addressed the
issue of preemption with regards to prescription drugs. Part IV will then continue with an
analysis of how courts have applied preemption in the wake of Mensing, with a particular focus
on design defect claims. Part IV will conclude with an examination of the First Circuit’s
decision Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc. and argue that the court erred by failing to hold that a
design defect claim against the generic manufacturer was preempted.27 Part V sets forth several
reasons why the Supreme Court is likely to reverse Bartlett, and suggests that all design defect
claims against generic drug manufacturers should be preempted.28
Part II: The Prescription Drug Regulatory Framework
The FDCA regulates the sale and labeling of all prescription drugs in the United States.29
A new prescription drug30 cannot be sold in the United States without the FDA’s prior
approval.31 When the sponsor32 of a new drug has gathered enough evidence regarding the
drug’s safety and efficacy, the sponsor then submits a New Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA.
24

See infra notes 29–64 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 65–99 and accompanying text.
26
See infra notes 100–158 and accompanying text.
27
See infra notes 159–211 and accompanying text.
28
See infra notes 212–251 and accompanying text.
29
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006).
30
21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (2009). A new drug is one that is not yet recognized as safe and effective to treat a particular
medical condition. Id.
31
21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
32
Often a brand-name drug manufacturer.
25
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The purpose of the NDA is to provide the FDA with enough information to allow the agency to
determine whether the drug is safe and effective for its proposed use.33
An Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) contains data that, when submitted to
the FDA, provides for the review and approval of a generic drug.34 Generic drug applications are
termed an “abbreviated” process because those manufacturers are generally not required to
include clinical data from test studies establishing the drug’s safety and efficacy.

Once

approved, the applicant may then manufacture and market the generic drug product.35
A.

New Drugs

In order to market a new prescription drug, the sponsor must submit a NDA,
accompanied by extensive clinical and scientific studies verifying the drug’s safety and efficacy
profile.36 The NDA includes, among other disclosures, the safety and efficacy reports from the
clinical trials, a list of all the components and composition of the drug, a description of the
methods and controls used in manufacturing, processing, and packaging the drug, samples of the
drug, and examples of intended labeling.37 The FDA may deny the approval of a drug if it finds
that the labeling is insufficient.38
The brand-name manufacturer’s obligations continue after the FDA approves the drug.
The manufacturers must maintain records, conduct additional testing as directed, and advise the
FDA of significant adverse health consequences that are discovered following the drug’s
introduction to the market.39 Further, when new information about the safety of a drug becomes
apparent to the sponsor, the brand-name manufacturer has an obligation to update its label to
33

21 U.S.C. § 355(b).
Id.
35
21 C.F.R. § 314.50.
36
21 U.S.C. §§ 355(a)–(i).
37
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
38
21 U.S.C. § 355(c).
39
21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 314.80.
34
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reflect such warnings.40 If the labeling change is “major,”41 the manufacturer must obtain FDA
approval prior to implementing the change.42

On the other hand, “moderate [labeling]

changes,”43 may be implemented by the brand-name manufacturer before the FDA formally
approves the proposed change.44

Moderate labeling changes are implemented through the

Changes Being Effected (CBE) procedure.45
The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA)46 amended the
FDCA and gave the FDA additional tools to regulate prescription drugs. 47 The FDAAA added
section 505(o) to the FDCA which authorizes the FDA to mandate additional post marketing
studies and clinical trials for prescription drugs.48 It also authorizes the FDA, under certain
circumstances, to require a manufacturer to submit risk evaluation and mitigation strategies
(REMS) to ensure that the drug’s benefits continue to outweigh its risks.49

Lastly, the

amendment gave the FDA the authority to require drug manufacturers to implement safetyrelated labeling changes (SLC).50
B.

Generic Drugs

In 1984 Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act,
(commonly referred to as the “Hatch-Waxman Act”), to reduce the cost and increase the speed of

40

21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e).
21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b) (Major changes would include any alteration in the drug’s substance or production process
which could adversely affect the identity, strength, purity, or potency of the drug, or a major label change).
42
21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b).
43
21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) (Moderate changes would include alterations to the drug substance or production process
with a moderate possibility of adversely affecting the identity, strength, purity, or potency of a drug relating to safety
or effectiveness and many label changes, such as strengthening warnings, deleting misleading or unsupported
indications for use, or strengthening dosage or administration instructions).
44
21 C.F.R. §§ 314.70(c)(3), (6)(iii)(A)–(D).
45
21 C.F.R. §314.70(c)(6)(iii).
46
Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007).
47
Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007).
48
21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3).
49
21 U.S.C. § 355-1.
50
21 U.S.C. §§ 355(o), 355–1(g), 333(f).
41
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the approval of generic drugs.51 The Hatch-Waxman Act established the ANDA, an abridged
process through which generic versions of brand-name drugs can be approved.52 Unlike brandname sponsors, which must submit data from clinical trials demonstrating the safety and efficacy
of their drug, the generic sponsor can “piggyback” on the information the brand-name sponsor
already provided to the FDA.53 The generic sponsor need only establish that its generic product
is the same as the brand-name drug.54
The primary difference between a NDA and an ANDA is that the latter generally does
not require the extensive, and very expensive, pre-clinical and clinical studies that are the basis
for establishing the drug’s safety and efficacy profile in the NDA process. 55 Under the ANDA
process, the FDA will approve a generic drug for marketing upon proof that the drug is identical
in active ingredient(s), dosage form, strength, route of admission, has the same labeling, and is
bioequivalent to the brand-name drug.56

In other words, the ANDA process focuses on

establishing that the new generic drug is a copy of the brand-name drug in every significant
respect, including its bioequivalence to the already approved brand-name drug.57

A generic

drug is considered bioequivalent to the brand-name drug when there is no significant difference
in the rate and extent in which the drug becomes available in the body.58 In particular, the FDA
will determine whether the generic drug delivers the active ingredient(s) into the patients’

51

Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
53
21 C.F.R. § 355(j)(2)(A).
54
Purepac Pharm. Co. v. FDA, 354 F.3d 877, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2004); 21 C.F.R. § 355(j)(2)(A).
55
21 C.F.R. §314.94 (laying out the content and format of the ANDA).
56
21 C.F.R. §314.92(a)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).
57
21 C.F.R. §314.92(a)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).
58
21 C.F.R. § 320.1(e); see also Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff'd, 521 F.3d
253 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009) (noting that “[t]he ANDA applicant need only certify that the
generic manufacturer will produce a bio-equivalent of the brand name drug and that the labeling and warnings of the
generic drug are identical to that of the approved innovator drug”).
52
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bloodstream in the same quantities and at the same rate when administered under similar
conditions as the name-brand drug.59
Furthermore, the generic sponsor must show that, with certain exceptions,60 the labeling
of the generic drug is the same as the brand-name drug’s labeling.61

If the brand-name

manufacturer makes a labeling change to its drug, the generic manufacturer must mirror that
change in its corresponding drug labeling.62

If the brand-name manufacturer does not make a

labeling change, however, the generic manufacturer may not unilaterally change its drug
labeling.63 In fact, the FDA’s approval of an ANDA may be withdrawn if the labeling for the
generic drug is no longer consistent with that of the brand-name drug referred to in the ANDA.64
Part III: The Three Types of Product Defects
Product liability suits involving prescription drugs are state tort actions. 65 Under strict
products liability theory, a manufacturer may be held liable via three distinct types of product
defects: manufacturing defects, warning defects (as known as failure-to-warn claims), and design
defects.66
A.

Manufacturing Defect Claim

A manufacturing defect is an unintended flaw in the product from the result of improper
manufacturing.67 Typically, the plaintiff will allege that the product ultimately produced was

59

See 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(7).
21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iv). It identifies the following differences as acceptable: “[D]ifferences in expiration
date, formulation, bioavailability, or pharmacokinetics, labeling revisions made to comply with current FDA
labeling guidelines or other guidance, or omission of an indication or other aspect of labeling protected by patent or
accorded exclusivity under section 505(j)(4)(D) of the act.”
61
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iii).
62
See FDA, Guidance for Industry, Revising ANDA Labeling Following Revision of the RLD Labeling (May 2000)
(ANDA Labeling Revision Guidance).
63
57 Fed. Reg. 17961 (1992); see also PLIVA , Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2581–82 (2011).
64
21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b)(10).
65
MARK HERRMANN & DAVID B. ALDEN, DRUG AND DEVICE PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION STRATEGY 39 (2012).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 53.
60
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different from what the manufacturer intended.68 In assessing whether a manufacturing defect
exists, the law focuses on whether the product was made in accordance with the manufacturer’s
own standards.69

If the product is not in its “intended condition,” it is defective and the

manufacturer faces strict liability for injuries caused by the manufacturing defect.70 There is
generally no controversy over manufacturing defect law for prescription drugs.71
B.

Failure-to-Warn Claim

A failure-to-warn defect exists when the manufacturer fails to provide adequate warnings
regarding the risks associated with using the product.

72

The Restatement (Second) of Torts

explains that while some prescription drugs may be unavoidably unsafe, they are not
“unreasonably dangerous” when “accompanied by proper directions and warnings.”73 When
alleging a failure-to-warn, a plaintiff need only show that the manufacturer knew or should have
known that use of the product carried risks which the manufacturer failed to warn the plaintiff
against.74
In failure-to-claims against drug manufacturers, the issue centers on the drug’s labeling
and whether the warning was adequate.75 It is via the drug’s labeling in which the manufacturer
typically discloses the warnings regarding the drug.76 The Supreme Court addressed whether
failure-to-warn claims are preempted against drug manufacturers in Wyeth77 and Mensing.78
Wyeth held that failure-to-warn claims are not preempted against brand-name manufacturers
68

Id.
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
70
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (1965).
71
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah 1991) (explaining that this limitation on comment k immunity is
universally recognized).
72
W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 697 (5th ed. 1984).
73
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
74
W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 697 (5th ed. 1984).
75
See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 563 (2009).
76
Id. at 562.
77
555 U.S. 555 (2009).
78
131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
69
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while Mensing explained such claims are preempted against generic manufacturers.79 They left
unanswered, however, the question of preemption as it applies to non-failure-to-warn claims
against generic manufacturers.80 Accordingly, since Mensing was decided, trial courts across the
country have grappled with that unsolved issue and have had to interpret the breadth and scope
of the Court’s decision.
C.

Design Defect Claims

A design defect exists when the product is otherwise manufactured properly, but is
nonetheless unreasonably dangerous because of its inherent design.81 Alleging a design defect
claim depends heavily on whether the state it is brought under adheres to the Second or Third
Restatement of Torts, and how that state specifically interprets the Restatement.
With respect to design defect claims for prescription drugs, comment k to section 402(A)
of Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that a prescription drug, “properly prepared, and
accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably
dangerous.”82 Additionally, the seller of such a product will not be held strictly liable for the
“unfortunate consequences” that may arise from its use “merely because [the manufacturer] has
undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a
known but apparently reasonable risk.”83

In a claim alleging the defective design of a

prescription drug, comment k allows the manufacturer to escape strict liability if the risks
associated with the prescription drug were unavoidable.84 Once falling under comment k’s

79

Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 555; PLIVA v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2567 (2011).
See, Wyeth, 555 U.S. 555; Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567.
81
HERRMANN, supra note 65, at 46.
82
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. k (1965) (emphasis added).
83
Id.
84
E.g. Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981) (explaining the protections from strict
liability afforded by comment k).
80

11

protection, the prescription drug manufacturer is not held strictly liable on the basis of a
defective design.85
On its face, comment k would appear to preclude strict liability against design defect
claims for prescription drugs that are properly manufactured and accompanied by appropriate
warnings. In practice, however, the states have applied comment k in divergent ways,86 leading
to confusion as manufacturers face different standards depending on the jurisdiction.87
Regardless of the approach taken, however, the comment k defense will not apply, and the
manufacturer may be held strictly liable, if the drug was defectively manufactured or lacked
adequate warnings.88

85

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. b (1965).
Courts confronted with claims of defectively designed drugs have generally adopted comment k, but have
disagreed on the scope of protection that comment k affords prescription drugs. See Brown v. Superior Court
(Abbott Labs), 751 P.2d 470, 476 (Cal. 1988). Most courts apply comment k’s protection from strict liability in a
selective fashion, excepting from strict liability manufacturers of prescription drugs on a case-by-case basis. Id.
However, a sizeable minority of courts apply comment k’s protections to all manufacturers of prescription drugs,
excepting the manufacturers from strict liability on the basis of a defective design. E.g., Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm.
Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1980); Grundlerberg V. Upjohn Co. 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991).
87
See e.g., Grinage v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 862 (D. Md. 2011); Gross v. Pfizer, Inc., 825 F. Supp.
2d 654, 659 (D. Md. 2011). In Pennsylvania, comment k bars strict liability failure-to-warn, manufacturing defect,
and design defect claims for prescription drugs. Lance v. Wyeth, 4 A.3d 160, 165, 166 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (“With
our Supreme Court’s adoption of comment k, a design defect claim for strict liability is not cognizable under
Pennsylvania law when it is asserted against a manufacturer of prescription drugs,” but the plaintiff’s “negligent
design claim [wa]s not precluded by comment k, and [wa]s a valid cause of action upon which relief may be
granted.”). In Washington, comment k bars strict liability only to design defect and failure-to-warn claims for
prescription drugs. Transue v. Aesthetech Corp., 341 F.3d 911, 915, 917 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Under Washington law,
comment k affords a blanket exemption from strict liability for design defects in medical devices or products,” but
“should not be construed to provide protection for manufacturing defect claims”). In California and Utah, plaintiffs
may not pursue strict liability design defect claims for prescription drugs and devices. Brown v. Super. Ct., 751 P.2d
470, 477 (Cal. 1988) (“We…conclude that (1) a drug manufacturer’s liability for a defectively designed drug should
not be measured by the standards of strict liability; (2) because of the public interest in the development, availability,
and reasonable price of drugs, the appropriate test for determining responsibility is the test stated in comment k.”).
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 99 (Utah 1991) (“In light of the strong public interest in the availability and
affordability of prescription medications, the extensive regulatory system of the FDA, and the avenues of recovery
still available to plaintiffs…we conclude that a broad grant of immunity from strict liability claims based on design
defects should be extended to FDA-approved prescription drugs in Utah.”). In other states still, comment k amounts
to an affirmative defense that a prescription drug manufacturer may invoke after showing either that the product is
“unavoidably dangerous” or that its benefits outweigh its risk. Georgia – Bryant v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 585
S.E.2d 723, 728 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (“Comment k serves as an affirmative defense.”). Nebraska – Freeman v.
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d., 827, 840 (Neb. 2000) (“We conclude that § 402 A, comment k, of the
Second Restatement should be applied on a case-by-case basis and as an affirmative defense in cases involving
prescription drug products.”).
88
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. k (1965).
86
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Section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts offers even less solace to plaintiffs
injured by pharmaceuticals. It provides even more favorable protection to drug manufacturers by
stating:
A prescription drug . . . is not reasonably safe due to defective design if
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug . . . are sufficiently great in
relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care
providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits,
would not prescribe the drug . . . for any class of patients.89
Comment b to section 6(c) explains that a prescription drug manufacturer will be exempted from
strict liability on the basis of a defective design if any reasonable health care provider would
prescribe the drug to any class of patients.90 Essentially, if a prescription drug confers a benefit
upon a small class of patients, while harming other classes, it cannot be considered defectively
designed.91 This reflects the judgment that as long as a drug provides a net benefit to at least one
class of patients, it should be available on the market for a physician to prescribe.92
Adding to the complexities of the design defect analysis for prescription drugs are several
additional factors. First, the competing views of the Restatement (Second) and (Third), as well
as the opposing applications of comment k, illustrate the diverging view regarding judicial riskutility review of prescription drug designs.93 Additionally, the Restatements hold different views
regarding the proper role of the FDA in reviewing prescription drug designs. Prescription drugs
contain inherent risks and it is under the FDA’s risk-benefit analysis in which the agency
89
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determines whether the drug’s benefits outweigh its risk.94 Some courts follow the approach of
the Third Restatement and have declined to hold manufacturers of FDA-approved prescription
drugs strictly liable on the basis of a defective design, deferring to the FDA-approval process.95
However, most courts have held that FDA approval should not prevent judicial risk-utility
review of prescription drug designs, or prevent a finding that a prescription drug has been
defectively designed.96
Furthermore, once a prescription drug is approved the design of the drug’s chemical
composition cannot be changed without further FDA permission.97 Lastly, access to prescription
drugs, and their use, are largely dictated by the recommendations and directions of physicians
and other medical professionals.98 As a result, case law addressing design defect claims against
drug manufacturers has not been uniformly applied and varies significantly from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.99
Part IV: The Development of Preemption as it Applies to Prescription Drugs
A.

Introduction to Preemption

The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that “the Laws of the United
States shall be the supreme Law of the Land,” meaning that federal law will preempt and
supersede conflicting state law.100 There are two types of federal preemption. The first is
express preemption. This occurs when a federal law contains language that, by its very terms,
preempts state law.101 In such cases, a court first examines the language of the federal statute
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and determines if it should be read to preempt the state law.102 Then, the court must interpret the
scope of the preemption language and determine if the state law falls within the scope of the
intended preemption.103
The second kind of preemption is implied preemption. Implied preemption occurs when
Congress has not inserted express preemptive language in a federal law, but nonetheless,
intended for the federal statute to preempt state law.104 There are three different types of implied
preemption. The first is conflict preemption, in which the conflict between federal and state law
makes it impossible to comply with both laws simultaneously.105 When this conflict exists,
courts will conclude that Congress intended for the federal law to supersede the state law.106 A
second type of conflict preemption occurs when the state law undermines the objectives of the
federal law.107 In this situation, even though it may be possible to comply with both the state and
federal law, the court will consider whether Congress intended to preclude state law from
creating obstacles to the accomplishment of the federal law.108 The court will examine the
federal law and its legislative history to determine the purpose of the federal law, and whether
the operation of the state law interferes with the objectives of the federal law.109 Finally, there is
field preemption.110 This occurs when Congress enacts broad legislation that is intended to
occupy the entire field of regulation, leaving no room for state laws on the same subject.111 The
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more comprehensive the federal law is, the more likely courts will find that Congress intended
for the federal law to preempt the state law.112
The FDCA contains an express preemption clause relating to medical devices, but does
not have a parallel provision governing pharmaceuticals.113 As such, courts have been forced to
consider whether claims against drug manufacturers, especially failure-to-warn claims, are
impliedly preempted.114 The Supreme Court has differentiated between cases involving brandname drugs and those involving their generic counterparts.115 The Court has held that failure-towarn claims involving brand-name drugs are not preempted because the manufacturer may alter
its labeling without FDA approval pursuant to federal regulations.116 On the other hand, failureto-warn cases involving generic drugs are preempted because generic drugs are required to be
identical, both in labeling and design, to their brand-name counterparts.117
Wyeth and Mensing are the leading Supreme Court cases discussing preemption as it
applies to the laws regulating prescription pharmaceuticals. Admittedly, these decisions only
addressed the preemption of failure-to-warn claims against drug manufacturers, but the reasoning
developed in these two cases can be extrapolated to design defect claims. There is no indication
that a generic manufacturer’s duty of “sameness” to the brand-name drug is somehow different
in the design context than it is in the labeling context.
B.

Failure-to-Warn Claims and Preemption
a. Wyeth v. Levine
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In Levine, the Supreme Court considered whether the FDA’s approval of a drug labeling
preempted state law products liability claims premised on the theory that the brand-name
manufacturer failed to adequately warn consumers about the drug’s known risks.118
In 2000, the plaintiff, Diana Levine, sought treatment for a migraine headache, and as
part of her treatment, she received the brand-name drug Phenergan through an IV-push
injection.119 Due to an error during administration, however, the drug entered Levine’s artery,
which ultimately led to gangrene and the amputation of her forearm.120 At trial, Levine claimed
that the label was defective because it failed to warn of the specific risks associated with the IVpush method.121 Wyeth countered that the FDA had approved the labeling and had rejected prior
iterations which would have strengthened the warnings for inadvertent intra-arterial injection.122
Levine brought a common law negligence and strict liability claims against Wyeth, the
brand-name manufacturer of Phenergan.123 A Vermont jury found for Levine and the court
denied Wyeth’s motion for judgment based on implied preemption.

124

The Supreme Court

granted certiorari on the issue of whether the FDA’s approval of a brand-name manufacturers
drug labeling preempts state law product liability claims premised on the theory that the drug’s
labeling failed to adequately warn of serious side effects.125 Wyeth advanced two implied
preemption arguments. First, Wyeth argued that it was impossible to comply with the state law
duty to modify Phenergan’s label without violating federal law, and second, that plaintiff’s claim
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created an obstacle to Congressional objectives by substituting a lay jury’s decision about drug
labeling for the expert judgment of the FDA.126 The Court rejected both arguments.127
With respect to the impossibility argument, the Court found that Wyeth could, in fact,
have changed or strengthened its warning label pursuant to the FDA’s Changes Being Effected
(CBE) regulations.128 These regulations permit a manufacturer to change its labeling without
waiting for the FDA’s approval.129 The CBE regulations permit labeling changes, not only when
a company acquires new safety information, but also when new analyses of previous data
justifies a labeling change.130 The Court found it significant that Levine had presented evidence
of at least twenty similar adverse events and that Wyeth “could have analyzed the accumulating
data and added a stronger warning about IV-push administration of the drug.”131 Therefore, the
Court held, it was possible for Wyeth to comply with both federal and state labeling
requirements.
Wyeth’s second preemption argument met a similar fate. The Court found that there was
“[p]owerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be the exclusive means of
ensuring drug safety and effectiveness.”132 As the Court explained, if Congress thought state
lawsuits would interfere with the FDA’s objectives regarding drug labeling, it would have
inserted an express preemption clause into the FDCA with regard to brand-name
manufacturers.133

The fact Congress did so for medical devices, but not for brand-name
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prescription drugs, reinforces the conclusion that Congress did not intend to preempt failure-towarn lawsuits.134
Furthermore, the Court declined to defer to the preamble in the FDA’s 2006 regulation
governing the content and format of prescription drug labels.135 In the regulation, the FDA
expressed its position that the approval of a drug’s labeling should preempt the state law duty to
change the drug’s labeling.136 Yet, the Court found this language to be “inherently suspect”
because it was not included in the proposed regulation—only the final rule—and constituted a
dramatic change in the agency’s prior position regarding preemption.137
Having rejected Wyeth’s two preemption arguments, the Court affirmed the verdict.
Thus, Levine established that conflict preemption does not apply to brand-name drug
manufacturers in state law failure-to-warn claims.138
b. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing
In Mensing, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court held that state law failure-to-warn
claims against generic pharmaceutical manufacturers are impliedly preempted by federal law. 139
In reaching this decision, the Court accepted the FDA’s interpretation of its own regulations that
generic manufacturers are prohibited from unilaterally changing or strengthening their product
labeling without prior FDA approval.140
Mensing involved two consolidated cases in which the plaintiffs, Gladys Mensing and
Julie Demahy, alleged that they developed tardive dyskinesia, an often irreversible movement
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disorder, as a result of taking the drug metoclopramide.141 The plaintiffs pursued state law
failure-to-warn claims against the generic manufacturers of metoclopramide, alleging that the
warnings for the drug failed to adequately disclose the risks of tardive dyskinesia.142 The generic
manufacturers moved to dismiss, arguing that the FDA regulations required the warnings on their
generic drugs to be the same as those of the brand-name product and that generic manufacturers
are precluded from unilaterally changing the labeling without FDA approval.143 Therefore, the
generic manufacturers argued, the plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims were preempted because it
was impossible for them to unilaterally add the plaintiffs’ proposed warnings without violating
FDA regulations.144
The two trial courts reached opposing conclusions on the generic manufacturers’ motion
to dismiss; one court granted the dismissal while the other allowed the suit to proceed.145 On
appeal, both the Fifth and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the manufacturers and
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that their claims were not preempted.146 The Supreme
Court then reversed, holding that the plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims were in fact preempted by
federal law.147 The Court explained that while brand-name manufacturers are responsible for the
labeling on their products, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments only require generic manufacturers
to ensure that their warnings match those of the brand-name product.148
First, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that generic manufacturers were free to
utilize the FDA’s CBE regulations, which allow manufacturers to unilaterally add or strengthen a

141

Id. at 2572. Metoclopramide is the generic form of Reglan, a prescription drug used to treat various digestive
track problems.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2572.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 2581–82.
148
Id.

20

drug’s warnings before obtaining FDA approval.149 In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied
on the FDA’s position that the CBE process was unavailable to generic manufacturers because it
would violate the requirement that the generic products’ warnings match those of the brandname products.150

Additionally, the Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the

defendants were free to send warnings to physicians through “Dear Doctor” letters.151 Again, the
Court’s position was based on the FDA’s interpretation that “Dear Doctor” letters constituted
labeling under FDA regulations, and generic manufacturers cannot unilaterally add or strengthen
warnings without prior FDA approval.152
Significantly, the majority of the Court established the proper test for impossibility
preemption. The Justices held that the “question for ‘impossibility’ is whether the private party
could independently do under federal law what state law require[d] of it”153 and that courts
should not strain to find ways to reconcile federal law with seemingly conflicting state law.154
Therefore, because the generic manufacturers could not independently change their drug’s
labeling, the Court held that it was impossible for the generic manufacturers to add the plaintiffs’
proposed warning without violating FDA regulations.155
C.

Design Defect Claims and Preemption

Most pharmaceutical design defect claims devolve into claims asserting that either the
FDA was wrong in approving the drug (which should either be preempted or barred by deference
149
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to the FDA’s decision to approve the drug) or the manufacturer wrongfully failed to withdraw
the drug from the market (commonly termed the “failure-to-withdraw” theory).156 Plaintiffs
have asserted the latter theory, developed from state tort law, in an attempt to evade federal
preemption.157 Practically every court to consider the issue, however, has held that failure-towithdraw claims are preempted because states cannot prohibit the sale and use of FDA approved
drugs.158
a. Preemption of Generic Manufacturer Claims After Mensing
156
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Plaintiffs have attempted to distinguish their design defect claims from failure-to-warn
claims, which the Supreme Court in Mensing definitively held are preempted against generic
drug manufacturers.159 For example, plaintiffs have asserted that failure-to-warn claims are
based on a duty to change the drug’s labeling (conduct that federal law prevents) while design
defect claims are based on a duty to stop selling the drug (conduct that federal law permits).160
But this is nothing more than wordplay. Stating that a failure-to-warn claim imposes liability
because a manufacturer failed to change its drug’s labeling is merely another way of stating that
liability is imposed because the manufacturer sold a product with a defective label.161 Thus,
plaintiffs will argue that generic manufacturers have two options to avoid liability: either change
the drug’s labeling or stop selling the drug.162 But since the former is preempted by Mensing,
generic manufacturers are then faced with choosing the latter option or potentially face liability.
Likewise, under a design defect claim, in which the plaintiff asserts that the manufacturer
sold a defectively designed product, state law offers the same two options: either change the
drug’s design or stop selling the drug. And because the Hatch-Waxman Amendments equally
preclude labeling and design changes by generic drug manufacturers, state law in both cases
seeks to impose liability for selling a product that generic manufacturers cannot lawfully
change.163 As a result, the only way for generic manufacturers to avoid liability is to stop
marketing its drug.164
It is because of this interplay that the rejection of the failure-to-withdraw theory by
Mensing cannot be limited to the failure-to-warn context. Otherwise, plaintiffs could always
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argue that the defendants were able to stop selling their products, and this rationale would
prevent defendants from ever successfully asserting conflict preemption. 165 Thus, the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Mensing must extend to design defect claims against generic manufacturers
“because every products [liability] case begins with a sale,” and “[w]ithout one, there is no basis
to sue-and no need for a preemption defense.”166 Specifically, by asserting that there was a statelaw duty not to market the drug, the claim arguably conflicts with, and is preempted by, the
FDA’s approval of the drug for sale.167
For this reason, the overwhelming majority of federal courts have held that the principles
espoused in Mensing also impliedly preempt design defect claims against generic
manufacturers.168 These decisions have expanded upon Mensing’s “duty of sameness,” holding
that federal law not only requires generic and brand-name pharmaceutical products to have
identical labeling, but they must also share the same product design.169

Because generic

manufacturers cannot unilaterally change the design of their drugs without FDA approval, courts
have held that design defect claims are also impliedly preempted under the principles established
in Mensing.170
Notably, these preempted claims include: failure-to-withdraw from the market;171 claims
alleging negligent concealment of important safety information; 172 negligent failure to test and
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negligent failure to inspect;173 failure to monitor the safety of the drug and report findings to the
FDA;174 fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment claims;175 breach of
express warranty;176 and design defect claims177 (with the exception of Bartlett v. Mutual
discussed infra).
b. Design Defect Claims Come to Forefront of Preemption Debate
The design defect claim, in particular, has assumed substantial importance since the
Supreme Court decided to review the Bartlett decision. In most jurisdictions, plaintiffs have
difficulty asserting design defect claims against pharmaceutical manufacturers for two primary
reasons. First, many jurisdictions require plaintiffs to prove that a safer alternative design
exists.178 Second, many jurisdictions have adopted comment k to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, section 402A, which immunizes manufacturers of “unavoidably unsafe” products where
the product is accompanied by an adequate warning.179 In the vast majority of pharmaceutical
cases, either the plaintiffs cannot prove that a safer alternative exists or the defendants can
establish the affirmative defense that the drug was accompanied by adequate warnings.
However, Bartlett poses neither of these issues: the court did not require proof of an
alternative design of the drug,180 and the defendants abandoned their comment k defense on the
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eve of trial.181 Consequently, the only remaining defense to the plaintiff’s design defect claim
was federal preemption.

Bartlett explained, however, that unlike the state law at issue in

Mensing, which required the generic manufacturer to change the label of the drug in question,
nothing in New Hampshire law required Mutual Pharmaceutical to alter the drug’s design.182
Rather, New Hampshire law required the generic manufacturer to stop selling the drug if it is
unreasonably unsafe.183 The court in Bartlett explained that a state law prohibiting the sale of
Mutual’s drug does not raise the issue of preemption because nothing in federal law affirmatively
requires Mutual to the market its drug.184 The First Circuit’s analysis circumvented the issue of
preemption, but in doing so the court created a larger problem. The state law effectively forces
generic manufacturers out of the market, undermining the public policy of making low cost
generic drugs available. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to definitively resolve the issue
of conflict preemption as applied to the laws regulating generic drug manufacturers.185
c. Bartlett v. Mutual Pharmaceutical
In Bartlett v. Mutual, the plaintiff suffered toxic epidermal necrolysis after taking
sulindac, a generic version of the non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug Clinoril.186 Plaintiff sued
the drug’s generic manufacturer in New Hampshire state court alleging several claims of
action.187 Mutual removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire
where the federal judge dismissed all but the design defect claim.188 Additionally, Mutual
waived its comment k defense to the design defect claim, presumably in a failed effort to prevent
the jury from becoming prejudiced by learning about the warnings and risks associated with the
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drug.189 At trial, plaintiff argued that sulindac’s risks outweighed its benefits, thus making it
unreasonably dangerous to consumers.190 The jury found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded
her over $21 million dollars.191
On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Mutual contended that
Bartlett’s claim should have failed as a matter of law because the plaintiff did not establish a
defect in the drug.192 The defendant also argued that the claim was preempted because the
FDCA required sulindac’s design to be the “same” as the brand-name drug’s design.193 With
respect to the requirements for a design defect claim, Mutual argued that New Hampshire law,
which follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A, required that a plaintiff prove
that the product was in a “defective condition,” as well as “unreasonably dangerous.”194 The
First Circuit rejected this argument.195 Instead, it held that the district court properly allowed the
plaintiff to establish that sulindac was defective solely by showing the drug was “unreasonably
dangerous” due to its risk of causing toxic epidermal necrolysis. 196
Next, the First Circuit dealt squarely with the generic manufacturer’s preemption
argument. The First Circuit stated that the Supreme Court in Wyeth adopted a “general nopreemption rule” and concluded that Mensing’s preemption did not apply outside the failure-towarn context.197 Yet, applying Wyeth’s reasoning to a design defect claim involving a generic
manufacturer presents several issues the court failed to resolve. The Wyeth decision involved
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preemption of brand-name drug manufacturers, not generic manufacturers.198 Accordingly, it
would have been more appropriate for the First Circuit to apply the reasoning established in
Mensing. Mensing, like Bartlett, involved a claim against a generic manufacturer, and even
though Mensing involved a failure-to-warn claim and Bartlett a design defect claim, there is no
logical rationale to distinguish between those two claims when asserted against a generic
manufacturer. The Hatch-Waxman Act precludes drug manufacturers “from unilaterally altering
either the label or design of their generic products,” thus both type of claims should be
preempted under Mensing.199
The court also failed to recognize that the statutes and regulations that govern brandname drugs are meaningfully different from those that govern generic drugs.200 As a result, the
First Circuit was quick to state that Mensing merely carved out an exception to Wyeth’s
presumption against preemption.201 But this is simply wrong because the Supreme Court in
Mensing refused to apply such a presumption against generic drug manufacturers, the same type
of drug manufacturers involved in Bartlett.202

The First Circuit even acknowledged that

targeting the drug’s design, instead of its labeling, did not provide a conceptually coherent basis
for distinguishing Mensing.203
Nonetheless, the court was not persuaded by the defendant’s argument that preemption
should extend to design defect claims because a generic manufacturer cannot unilaterally alter
the composition of its drug.204

The court’s reasoning was quite simple―the generic
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manufacturer could have chosen to not market the drug at all, an argument also known as the
failure-to-withdraw from the market theory.205 Thus, the court held that the design defect claim
was not preempted because, even though the generic manufacturer was precluded from changing
the drug’s composition, the manufacturer could have decided not to market the drug.206 The
court, however, conceded that this rationale was impossible to square with Mensing, where the
same failure-to-withdraw argument was made and rejected by the Supreme Court.207 The court
stressed that design defect claims against generic manufacturers and the possible preemption of
such a claim is an issue of “exceptional importance” that needs a definitive answer from the
Supreme Court.208
On November 30, 2012, the Supreme Court answered the First Circuit’s calling and
granted Mutual’s writ of certiorari.209

The Court will decide whether “federal [law] does not

preempt state law design-defect claims targeting generic pharmaceutical products because the
conceded conflict between such claims and the federal laws governing generic pharmaceutical
design allegedly can be avoided if the makers of the generic pharmaceuticals simply stop making
their products.”210 The Supreme Court should find that the failure-to-withdraw claims, and thus
design defect claims, are preempted. States simply cannot prohibit the marketing and sale of
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FDA approved drugs.211 For this reason, as well as others to be explained below, it is likely the
Supreme Court will reverse the First Circuit’s decision.
Part V: Supreme Court is Poised to Reverse Mensing
The Supreme Court is poised to adjudge whether design defect claims are preempted
against generic manufacturers, as well as the broader question of how far the reasoning in
Mensing extends. Bartlett was wrongly decided for a multitude of reasons, and re-opens avenues
of liability that the Supreme Court closed in Mensing.212 In Mensing, the Court was clear that
generic drug manufacturers are required under federal law to produce drugs that are the “same
as” their brand-name counterparts and any state law requirement that conflict with this federal
duty of “sameness” is preempted.213
A.

Bartlett was Wrong to Minimize the Holding in Mensing

In Bartlett, the First Circuit cited to Wyeth as authority against preemption,214 but that
decision actually supports the finding of preemption for generic manufacturers. In Wyeth, the
Court held that failure-to-warn claims were not preempted because the CBE regulations allowed
brand-name manufacturers to unilaterally strengthen their drugs’ labeling.215

The same,

however, is not true for generic manufacturers. Federal statutes and regulations that apply to
brand-name manufacturers are meaningfully different than those that apply to generic
manufacturers.216 The Hatch-Waxman Act’s “sameness” mandate expressly precludes generic
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manufacturers from unilaterally altering either the labeling or design of their generic products.217
Consequently, it was ill-founded for the court in Bartlett to find Wyeth controlling in light of the
Supreme Court’s holding in Mensing.
Furthermore, the dissenting justices in Mensing reiterated the limitation of Wyeth’s
applicability to generic drug cases.218 They explained that:
[A] drug consumer’s right to compensation for inadequate warnings now
turns on the happenstance of whether her pharmacist filled her prescription
with a brand-name drug or a generic drug. If a consumer takes a brandname drug, she can sue the manufacturer for inadequate warnings under
our opinion in Wyeth. If, however, she takes a generic drug, as occurs 75
percent of the time, she now has no right to sue.219
This passage clearly expresses the distinction between Wyeth and Mensing. For example, if the
plaintiff took a brand-name drug, then according to Wyeth, the failure-to-warn claim is not
preempted.220 If the plaintiff, however, took a generic drug, then according to both the majority
and dissenting Justices in Mensing the plaintiff cannot sue the generic manufactures.221
Accordingly, Mensing is not, as the First Circuit stated, a narrow exception to a general rule
announced in Wyeth.
B.

Generic Manufacturers are Precluded From Changing the Design of Their Drugs

Although the Mensing decision only addressed failure-to-warn claims,222 its reasoning
applies with equal force to design defect claims. In Mensing, the Supreme Court held that state
law claims involving generic drugs are preempted where the plaintiff alleges that the generic

meaningfully different than those that apply to generic drug manufacturers” and “different federal statutes and
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217
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manufacturer should have changed aspects of its product which the manufacturer could not have
unilaterally done without violating federal law or FDA regulations.223
Given that generic manufacturers are legally bound to use the brand-name drug’s design,
an overwhelming number of federal courts have held that state law product liability claims
alleging the drug was defectively designed are also preempted under Mensing.224 The identical
“duty of sameness” that precludes generic manufacturers from unilaterally changing its drug
labeling also precludes generic manufacturers from unilaterally changing the design of its drugs.
The First Circuit admitted that a generic manufacturer could not legally alter the composition of
its drug, but still refused to find that this preempted a design defect claim.225 Instead, the First
Circuit sidestepped the preemption issue by explaining that Mutual was not held liable for failing
to change sulindac’s design, but rather, was held liable for selling an unreasonably dangerous
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product.226 And since federal law does not require Mutual to market sulindac, a state law that
prohibits generic manufacturers from selling the drug, if it is unreasonably dangerous, would not
be preempted. As the Comment will explain in detail below, such an assertion is fundamentally
flawed.
C.

Preemption Cannot be Premised on a “Failure-to-Withdraw” Claim

In Bartlett, the court held that even though a generic manufacturer is precluded from
altering the composition of their drugs, they could have avoided liability for a defectively
designed product by declining to sell their drugs altogether.227 The First Circuit asserted that
because the FDCA did not prevent Mutual from selling sulindac, a claim arising out of the
manufacturers failure to do so would not be preempted under Mensing.228 Yet this assertion,
which even the Bartlett court conceded is fundamentally inconsistent with the reasoning in
Mensing,229 has consistently been rejected by the Supreme Court and other circuits.230
In their petitions to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs in Mensing argued that their failureto-warn claims were not preempted because of the same “failure-to-withdraw” from the market
theory asserted in Bartlett.231

The Court rejected their petition, and on remand, the Eighth

Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court’s ruling in Mensing to encompass the plaintiffs’ failure-towithdraw claims and vacated the portion of its earlier opinion that embraced the theory.232 In
doing so, the Eighth Circuit understood that if the Supreme Court viewed the failure-to-withdraw
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from the market theory as a legitimate means to avoid conflict preemption, it would not have
found compliance with both the state and federal law impossible.233
Likewise, the Sixth Circuit rejected the failure-to-withdraw argument.234 On appeal in
Smith v. Wyeth, Inc., the plaintiffs argued that the failure-to-withdraw theory was consistent with
Mensing because no federal law prohibited generic manufacturers from independently
suspending the sale of their drugs.235 The Sixth Circuit was not persuaded, and affirmed its grant
of summary judgment on the issue of preemption.236
Courts have rejected the failure-to-withdraw argument because a “state law duty that
would compel generic manufacturers to stop production of a drug that under federal law they
have the authority to produce. . . would directly conflict with the federal statutory scheme in
which Congress vested sole authority with the FDA to determine whether a drug” could be sold
and marketed throughout the United States.237 Thus, a state law that would permit a jury to
reassess the risks and benefits of an FDA approved drug cannot coexist with the FDA’s drug
approval authority. A failure-to-withdraw claim strikes at the very essence of the FDA’s power
to determine what prescription drugs can be marketed in the United States.
Similarly, every other federal appellate court to consider a design defect claim against a
generic manufacturer has rejected the failure-to-withdraw from the market theory in light of
Mensing.238 The District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana stated that the failure-towithdraw from the market theory is nothing more than a “cleverly dress[ed] up failure to warn
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claim[] in a tempting but ultimately illegitimate guise.”239 The court explained that if state law
could require a generic manufacturer to withdraw its drug from the market based on the
unreasonable danger of the product, then it necessarily must also repudiate the labeling approved
by the FDA.240 And since failure-to-warn claims against generic manufacturers are undisputedly
preempted by Mensing,241 so too must the failure-to-withdraw from the market theory.
Lastly, the failure-to-withdraw from the market theory would “render conflict preemption largely meaningless because it would make most conflicts between state and federal law
illusory.”242 A failure-to-withdraw claim could be made anytime the issue of impossibility
preemption arises since a conflict between state and federal law would always be avoided by
withdrawing from the regulated conduct altogether.243

Consequently, the Supreme Court

recognizes that requiring drug manufacturers to withdraw their products from the market or face
state law liability does not avoid the conflict between federal law and state tort law
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obligations.244

Rather, it exacerbates that conflict by ensuring that state law requirements

triumph over federal requirements, in direct conflict with the Supremacy Clause.
D.

Implications of the Supreme Court’s Decision

If the Supreme Court reverses Bartlett that will greatly reduce the liability generic drug
manufacturers may face. After Mensing¸ all claims premised on a failure-to-warn theory were
preempted,245 and if Bartlett is reversed, then design defect claims will also be preempted. This
will, in effect, immunize generic manufacturers from the majority of state law product liability
claims that a plaintiff may bring.
A system where generic manufacturers are not held accountable to consumers injured by
their drugs is not a desirable situation.246 This leaves many consumers with a difficult dilemma.
Does the consumer purchase the low cost generic drug, but then be without a remedy for
resultant injuries, or does the consumer pay more for the brand-name drug so the manufacturer
can be sued in the event of an injury?
In Mensing, the Supreme Court acknowledged the “unfortunate hand” the plaintiff was
dealt by the federal regulations when her failure-to-warn claim was preempted.247 But at the
same time, the Court explained that “‘it is not this Court’s task to decide whether the statutory
scheme established by Congress is unusual or even bizarre.’”248

Congress stuck a careful

balance between the public and private interests in passing the Hatch-Waxman Act. It is not the
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role of the judiciary to second guess this judgment and recognize a state tort remedy that
conflicts with federal law.
Congress entrusted the FDA with regulating the national market for prescription drugs,
and the agency grants approval only if it determines that the drug is safe and effective for its
intended use.249

It would then be inconsistent with the FDCA to allow a lay jury to

independently assess the health risks and benefits of a FDA approved drug and second guess the
FDA’s safety determination. Such an ad-hoc reconsideration on a state-by-state and lawsuit-bylawsuit basis would completely undermine the FDA’s drug approval process.250
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the Supreme Court should reverse Bartlett and
hold that design defect claims, just like failure-to-warn claims, are preempted when brought
against generic manufacturers. It is not the role of the courts to recognize a state tort remedy that
conflicts with federal law, no matter how unfortunate it may be for the plaintiff. As always, it is
the duty of Congress and the FDA to change the laws and regulations governing prescription
drugs if they see fit.251
Conclusion
As the number of generic drugs on the market continues to rise,252 issues involving
generic drugs and preemption will continue to confront the courts. In addressing Bartlett, the
Court should reason that a generic manufacturer’s federal “ongoing duty of sameness”
requirement is no different in the design context than it is in the labeling context. This “duty of
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sameness” is even more pertinent in the design context, as the generic product must be the same
as the brand-name drug.
In Mensing, the Supreme Court stressed that the Supremacy Clause should not be
distorted “in order to create similar pre-emption across a dissimilar statutory scheme.”253 The
converse is also true. The Supremacy Clause may not be distorted in order to create dissimilar
preemption across a similar statutory scheme. Yet this is exactly what the First Circuit did in
Bartlett.254 Faced with the same regulatory scheme at issue in Mensing, the First Circuit crafted
a remedy for individuals harmed by generic drugs.255 In doing so, however, that court ignored
the rationale of Mensing256 and ran roughshod over the statutory scheme carefully crafted by
Congress. The decision of the Supreme Court to review the Bartlett decision presents the perfect
opportunity for the Court to expand Mensing’s holding to non-failure-to-warn claims, ending the
preemption debate.
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